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7The Disruption and (Re)creation of
Party-Cleavage Linkages
This chapter qualitatively analyzes two questions that emerged from the previous
chapter: (1) why did the relatively short period (1980–83) of suspension of party
politics in Turkey seriously damage the embryonic link between political parties and
social cleavages that had formed by the late 1970s? and (2) why did the recent party
system in Turkey gain the capacity to better represent Sunni religiosity and Kurdish
ethnicity? The answers can be sought in institutional changes as well as endogenous
and exogenous factors that induced these changes.
7.1. The 1980 Military Intervention and the Disruption of Party Politics
The military government during the 1980–83 period, led by the National Security
Council, attempted to institute a stable two-party system by purging the system of the
current parties and politicians. First, major politicians were arrested and the parlia-
ment was dissolved. Then, all political parties were disbanded in 1981 under Law
2533, which was approved by the National Security Council on October 16, 1981. It
banned the reopening of the disbanded political parties as well as the formation of any
new political party with the same name as a party disbanded in 1981. Second, the
military introduced the 1982 constitution, which was more authoritarian than the
1961 constitution. In particular, Provisional Article 4 under the new constitution
prohibited the cadres of the disbanded parties from political activities for ten years
(until 1992) and other parliamentarians of these parties from forming parties or
becoming party cadres for five years (until 1987) after its promulgation. Third, for the
transition election in 1983, the National Security Council was given the authority to
screen candidates and political parties. Consequently, only three of the newly formed
parties were allowed to compete.1 The other parties that applied for candidacy were
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rejected since nearly all of them were successors of the disbanded parties.
It is true that the legal prohibitions left behind by the military were not able to stifle
the activities of the old political forces as the nation moved toward redemocratization
(Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2). The successor parties, headed by proxy leaders, launched
political activities while the former leaders made public speeches. While these suc-
cessor parties could not participate in the 1983 transition election, two of them
succeeded in capturing parliamentary seats by merging with, or in effect taking over,
two parties in the parliament that had little popular support from the beginning and
were increasingly losing popularity.2 The center-left Social Democracy Party (Sosyal
Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP), which succeeded the CHP, merged with the Populist
Party (Halkçı Parti, HP) and changed its name to SHP in 1985. The center-right True
Path Party (Do%gru Yol Partisi, DYP), which succeeded the AP, finally in 1986 ab-
sorbed most of the parliamentarians of the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi
Demokrasi Partisi, MDP), which dissolved itself.
With the de facto liberalization of political activities for former political forces and
growing pressure from opposition parties, in 1987 the ruling ANAP proposed a
referendum on whether to lift the ban on former politicians earlier than the original
schedule.3 Prime Minister Turgut Özal hoped for a rejection of the proposal so that
former party leaders would be discredited and perhaps never return, but the result was
approval by a margin of less than 1 percent. In the 1987 general election that followed,
former politicians were able to participate under their former leaders, who had just
become the leaders of the successor parties.4
Nevertheless, the planned (and even achieved) periods of bans on the former politi-
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Fig. 7-1. Rise and Decline of Political Parties in Turkey, 1961–77
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III.
Note: The positions of the parties on the left-right continuum were judged by the
author according to Özbudun (1976).
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cians and parties5 were long enough to force former politicians into retirement and to
weaken the organizations of the disbanded parties as well as to encourage factional
splits within them. This long interruption weakened the embryonic ties between
societal groupings and political parties that had begun to appear by the late 1970s. It
can be recalled from Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10 that the relationships between social
cleavages and cleavage-type volatilities had shown signs of stability, but that after
1980, the relationships first regressed into instability.
7.2. The Protracted Development of the Religiosity-Party Nexus
The growing level of representation in the Turkish political system in the late 1990s,
especially on the basis of Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity, poses a question:
why and how were these pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish parties created, in 1970 and
1990 respectively, and allowed to exist in Turkey despite the strict principles of
secularism and the unitary state?6 The following two sections examine the emergence
of the two parties in light of internal and external factors.
Source: Compiled by the author from Appendix III.
Note: Major successor parties for per-1980 parties include the DYP
for the AP, the SHP/CHP for the CHP, the MÇP/MHP for the MHP,
and the RP/FP/AKP for the MSP. The positions of the parties on the
left-right continuum are based on voters’ party positions reported in
Kalaycıo%glu (1999, p. 58).
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Regarding the emergence of the pro-Islamic party, the liberal 1961 constitution and
the freedom of association it guaranteed opened political opportunities7 in two ways.
First, the number of religious organizations and their activities grew. Religious groups
formed associations, rather than political parties of their own, to exert political influ-
ence (Özek n.d., p. 560). In particular, there was an expansion of the percentage of
religious-education associations, whose objective was to support private Koran courses
and imam-hatip lisesis and to promote mutual support among imams and hatips
(Figure 7-3) (Yücekök 1971, p. 146). These associations were more politically moti-
vated than those organized for the construction of mosques, as they sought to promote
Islamic values in society by spreading Islamic education. These political religious
associations formed an important social base for the emergent pro-Islamic party.
Second, the 1961 constitution, in Article 56, defended political parties as “an
essential element for democratic politics” and allowed political parties to be founded
without prior permission and to act freely. Although political parties that violated the
principles of secularism and the unitary state were to be disbanded (Article 57), the
fundamental rights of political parties became constitutionally guaranteed for the first
time in Turkish history.8 This freedom of association provided impetus for the cre-
ation of 11 new political parties in 1961 alone,9 including the TI
.
P, which later gained
15 parliamentary seats in the 1965 general election.
The internal factors that led to the formation of the pro-Islamic party in Turkey
involved internal struggles in the AP and among Turkish capitalists. The establish-
ment of a pro-Islamic party was initiated by a few religious conservatives of the AP
but was later led by Necmettin Erbakan. In 1967, A. Tevfik Paksu (Senator from
Kahramanmaras¸ Province), Hasan Aksay (Representative from Adana Province), and
Arif Hikmet Güner (Representative from Rize Province) tried to move the party
toward a more religious line (Çakır 1994, p. 19). After their attempt failed, they chose
to create a religiously oriented political party together with Necmettin Erbakan.
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 Erbakan’s emergence partly reflected a power struggle within the Union of Cham-
bers and Exchanges in Turkey.10 Within the union, the largest business organization in
Turkey, small capitalists in Central Anatolia had intensified their criticism of the AP
government for being close to large capital in Istanbul. In the 1969 election for the
union’s president, they supported Erbakan. After his victory was annulled through the
intervention of the prime minister, Erbakan entered politics. Since his application for
candidacy on the AP ticket was rejected, he ran as an independent and was elected
from Konya Province in the 1969 general election.
In 1970, he founded Turkey’s first pro-Islamic party with any organizational basis,
the MNP.11 After the MNP was disbanded for anti-secular propaganda under a deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court in 1971, it was succeeded by the MSP in 1972. While
the first pro-Islamic party was said to be a brainchild of Mehmet Zahit Kotku,12 leader
of one of the largest Naks¸ibendi factions (I.skender Pas¸a Dergâhı), who advised
Erbakan to establish the party, it was in effect supported by a coalition that included
other Naks¸ibendi factions as well as the Nurcu (its Yazıcı group in particular) and
Kadiri factions (Çakır 1994, p. 21; Yalçın 1994, pp. 51–54).
It took a long time, however, to consolidate support among devout Sunnis for the
pro-Islamic party. This was primarily due to the pragmatic party choices of religious
organizations and voters. Since its foundation in 1970, the pro-Islamic party had to
compete with center-right or rightist parties13 for the votes of devout Sunnis. During
the two coalition governments (First Nationalist Front government (1975–77) and
Second Nationalist Front government (1977–78)) composed of center-right and right-
ist parties, both the center-right AP and pro-Islamist MSP competed with proposals
for the expansion of religious education (Duman 1997, p. 162). The policy differ-
ences between these two groups of parties appeared narrow. In addition, the direction
of bloc votes from Sunni religious organizations had an important impact on the
electoral outcomes. In the 1973 general election, a large coalition of religious organi-
zations supported the pro-Islamic MSP but in the 1977 election the Nurcu faction’s
Yazıcı group, in reaction to the Naks¸ibendi control of the party leadership, withdrew
its support (Yalçın 1994, pp. 106–12, 124; Çakır 1994, p. 21; Duman 1997, p. 94).
As a result, the MSP’s initial euphoria in the 1973 election receded in the 1977
election. The party’s vote percentage declined from 11.8 in 1973 to 8.6 in 1977.
Provincial voting patterns seem to indicate that between 1973 and 1977, devout Sunni
voters defected to other parties (Table 6-8). The correlation between the indicator of
Sunni religiosity at the provincial level and the vote for the MSP, which was statisti-
cally significant in 1973 (r = 0.236, p = 0.054), became nonsignificant in 1977 (r =
−0.053, p = 0.668). On the other hand, in 1977 the largest center-right party, the AP,
regained part of its devout supporters lost to the MSP and the splinter Democratic
Party (Demokratik Parti, DP)14 in the 1973 election. The correlation between the
indicator of Sunni religiosity and vote for the center-right AP moved from
nonsignificance (r = 0.084, p = 0.500) in 1973 to statistical significance (r = 0.364,
p = 0.003) in 1977.15
During the 1980s and early 1990s, not only the supporters but also the former
members of the MSP split into ANAP and the RP. After the abolition of all existing
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political parties in 1980 and the suspension of political activities, many religiously
oriented politicians were absorbed into the newly formed ANAP, which ruled Turkey
from 1983 to 1991. The major part of the (dominant) religious wing of ANAP came
from the I
.
skender Pas¸a faction. Even after the RP entered electoral competition in
1984, the I
.
skender Pas¸a followers in ANAP did not return to the pro-Islamic party
(Çakır 1990, p. 38).
After the 1995 general election made the pro-Islamic RP the largest party in the
parliament (with just 21.4 percent of the vote), however, prominent members of the
religious wing of ANAP, such as Abdülkâdir Aksu, Ali Cos¸kun, and Cemil Çiçek
defected either to the RP or to its successor, the FP. Thus, starting in the mid-1990s,
religious votes began to move toward the pro-Islamic party from ANAP, which in the
1980s had secured a large part of the bloc votes of religious organizations, most
notably various subgroups of the Naks¸ibendi sect. At the same time, devout Sunni
Kurdish voters in southeastern Turkey shifted their support away from the pro-Islamic
party to the pro-Kurdish party that had been newly formed in 1990, thus making the
pro-Islamic party less influential than previously in that region.
7.3. The Emergence of the Pro-Kurdish Party
The first pro-Kurdish party, the People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP),
was formed on June 7, 1990 by 11 former-SHP parliamentarians. Seven were of
Kurdish origin and had been expelled from their party for having participated in a
conference in Paris on the Kurdish issue in October 1989. At first, the party aimed to
achieve the integration of Kurds and Turks. The 16 ex-SHP deputies who initially
participated in the preparatory body, New Democratic Formation (Yeni Demokratik
Olus¸um), included Turkish parliamentarians as well who had belonged to the left-
wing faction of the SHP and had been, together with the Kurdish parliamentarians,
sidelined by the right-wing faction that had won the intra-party struggle. When the
Kurdish inclinations of the prospective party increased, however, most of these parlia-
mentarians of Turkish origin chose not to join the new party. As a result, HEP’s color
became more Kurdish than originally planned (Ölmez 1995, pp. 54–103).
There were both endogenous and exogenous factors that enabled HEP to take part
in the October 1991 general election on the SHP ticket, eventually gaining 22 seats.16
Endogenously, the expulsion of the parliamentarians from the SHP aroused, from
inside the party, sympathy for them and their claims. The SHP leadership could not
neglect the change of tide within the party. In order to demonstrate its interest in the
issue, it published in July a report on the southeastern (Kurdish) area, prepared mostly
by Hikmet Çetin, a mainstream SHP parliamentarian of Kurdish origin, recommend-
ing greater freedom in identity, expression, and language.
At a deeper level, Turkey’s lingering war with the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK)17 and harsh security measures toward local “collabora-
tors” made the Kurdish population more expressive of their grievances. Qualitative
change became obvious by 1990 when there was a marked surge in civil protests
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against the security forces. In addition to a rapid increase in the number of protest
participants and deaths caused by the security forces, for the first time, the bodies of
PKK guerillas were collected from the authorities by their families for public funerals
(McDowall 2004, pp. 428–29). Such incidents became more frequently reported in
the press after martial law and the press ban for the region was lifted in 1987, to be
replaced by the less restrictive emergency rule.
Turkish public opinion thus became more sympathetic toward the Kurdish issue,
which the Turkish state had long denied, stating that the people in southeastern
Turkey were “Mountain Turks.” Kiris¸çi and Windrow (1997, p. 113) found that there
were an increasing number of publications by the late 1980s that explicitly dealt with
Kurdish ethnicity. A review of the mainstream daily Hürriyet from 1984 to 1998 by
Somer (2005; 2004, p. 247) showed that 1987 saw the first perceptible increase in the
number of articles referring to domestic Kurds in Turkey, before news and discussion
on the Kurdish issue became full-fledged in the 1990s (Figure 7-4). Although in the
late 1980s the press primarily associated the Kurdish issue with terrorism by the PKK,
leading columnists also mentioned the problems of underdevelopment in the region
and maltreatment of the local population by security forces (Gençkaya 1994).
There were three interrelated exogenous factors. First, the Halabja massacre by
Saddam Hussein in 1988 led to the first wave of approximately 110,000 Kurdish
refugees from northern Iraq to southeastern Turkey. Local Kurds visited and helped
the Iraqi Kurds in the refugee camps. This development strengthened the sense of
Kurdish identity in the region (Kıs¸lalı 1996, pp. 181–82). At the same time, Turks
witnessed the calamities experienced by the Kurds and came to feel increasing sym-
pathy with them.18 Second, President Turgut Özal took the initiative in changing state
policy toward the Kurds, initially by acknowledging in June 1989 that he had Kurdish
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blood (Kiris¸çi and Winrow 1997, p. 113). Özal realized that the Kurdish issue re-
quired a realistic solution that incorporated not only military power but also the
recognition of Kurdish identity. Third, international pressure due to the Gulf War
accelerated the process of liberalization that Özal had started (Somer 2004, p. 248).
The Turkish parliament lifted the ban on the Kurdish language in April 1991, “imme-
diately after more than one and half million Kurdish refugees from Iraq poured into
Iran and Turkey” (Kiris¸çi  and Winrow 1997, p. 113).19
In the long term, however, HEP failed to take advantage of the unfolding political
opportunities. As the PKK began to use HEP for its own political cause, HEP pushed
for more liberalization and concessions from the state. In November 1991, two of its
parliamentarians gave their parliamentary oath in Kurdish, angering the Turkish es-
tablishment as well as the public. During the “bloody (Kurdish) Nevruz [New Year]
celebration” in March 1992, serious clashes occurred between the security forces and
local Kurds, supported by HEP members, who demanded more freedom in the Kurd-
populated region. These militant actions backfired and turned the state and public
opinion against the Kurdish aspiration for cultural freedom. The state prosecution
sued HEP for separatist acts. Before the constitutional court disbanded the party, its
members joined the successor party, the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP).
The new party did not last long, either. After its leader, Hatip Dicle, defended the
PKK’s killing of military cadets in January 1994, saying that they had been wearing
military uniforms and thus had been military targets, the government swiftly passed a
motion lifting the immunity of DEP parliamentarians. Six DEP parliamentarians were
immediately arrested and jailed. Four were sentenced to 15 years in prison, and the
party was disbanded by the constitutional court.
Despite these pressures from the state, the pro-Kurdish party persisted, with DEP
being succeeded by HADEP and then DEHAP. Although DEHAP’s national vote
percentage in general elections never reached the 10 percent minimal requirement for
gaining parliamentary seats, it rose gradually but steadily to 6.2 percent in 2002,
while the party consolidated its electoral base in the Kurd-populated region. It partici-
pated in a general local election for the first time in 1999, gaining 36 mayoral posts
mainly in the Kurd-populated region. While it was the first party in 5 of the 23 eastern
and southeastern provinces20 in 1995, it became the first in 1121 and 1322 of the said
provinces in 1999 and 2002, respectively. The magnitude of DEHAP’s strength in the
Kurd-populated region was evident especially in 2002 compared with the AKP, which
won the general election with 34.3 percent of the vote but came first only in 10
provinces in the east and southeast (Tuncer, Kasapbas¸, and Tuncer 2003, p. 321).
7.4. Party Dissolution and Succession
The previous descriptions of the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish parties mentioned in-
stances of party closures. The present 1982 constitution, in the fourth paragraph of
Article 68, virtually bans parties that aim for separatism or communism, or parties
that violate secularism or democracy:
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The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in
conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and
nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the
principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish
class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to
crime.23
If political parties violate the above article, they can be disbanded by a court decision
following prosecution (Article 69). The law regulating political parties contains more
detailed stipulations for disbanding parties. Accordingly, failure to account for rev-
enues and expenditures as well as failure to participate in two consecutive elections
are among the grounds for disbandment.
One might argue that closing down political parties is a serious infringement of
democratic rights. This claim can be disputed, however, for the following reasons.
First, both the 1961 and 1982 constitutions guaranteed the rights of political parties as
an essential element of democracy, though they were not permitted to violate the
fundamental principles of the republic. The explicit recognition in the Turkish consti-
tutions of political parties as actors in democracy as well as the limitation of their
rights was inspired by the German constitution (Basic Law) that adopted the idea of
“militant democracy” (Özbudun 1993, p. 66). The denial to antidemocratic forces of
access to the public sphere is elaborated in Article 21 (2): “Parties which, by reason of
their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free
democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question
of unconstitutionality.”24
Second, it is not simply the judiciary but only its highest organ, the constitutional
court, that can disband a political party that has been prosecuted.25 Party closure thus
cannot be easily manipulated by the government. Although the judicial bureaucracy
enshrines secularism and the Turkish nation-state, the decisions of the constitutional
court are based on specific clauses of the constitution. Kabo %glu (1994, p. 110) argued
that the constitutional court’s decisions on party closure secured the rights of political
parties to the extent that the decisions did not depart from the criteria of legality. More
generally, public opinion also regards the constitutional court as the guarantor of
Turkish secular democracy.26
Third, party closure has affected only a few parties in the parliament. Between
1964 and 2004, 31 closure suits were filed by the prosecution, leading to the disband-
ment of 22 political parties (Table 7-1). If the CHP is excluded from this list of
disbanded parties since it was soon legalized by an amendment of the law of political
parties,27 only 5 of the 21 disbanded parties had seats in the last parliament before the
closure suit was filed. Moreover, four of the five, the pro-Islamic RP and FP as well as
pro-Kurdish HEP and DEP, were succeeded by new parties with almost the same
members and organizations.
Party closure is not a death sentence for a political party. Parties with a strong social
basis such as the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish parties were disbanded but repeatedly
reemerged, being succeeded by the same parties but with different names. In contrast
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to the bans stipulated (but abolished in 1987) in the 1982 constitution on former
parties and politicians for five or ten years, there are loopholes in the provisions
relevant to party dissolution. For instance, Article 84 of the constitution originally
stipulated that parliamentarians of the disbanded party would lose their seats when the
dissolution suit was filed (in the case of parliamentarians who became the reason for
TABLE 7-1
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION ON PARTY CLOSURE SUITS, 1962–2004
Partya Dateb Closurec In Parliamentd
Workers and Peasants Party Oct. 15, 1968 ×
National Order Party (MNP) May 20, 1971 ×
Progressive Country Party Jun. 29, 1971 ×
Turkish Labor Party (TI.P) Jul. 20, 1971 × ×
Great Anatolian Party Dec. 19, 1972 ×
Turkish Workers Party May 8, 1980 ×
Supreme Duty Party Aug. 25, 1983
New Order Party Sep. 28, 1983
Peaceful Turkey Party Oct. 25, 1983 ×
Our Party Nov. 1, 1983
Conservative Party Nov. 3, 1983
True Path Party (DYP) Nov. 9, 1984
Flag Party May 2, 1989
Socialist Party Dec. 8, 1988
United Communist Party of Turkey Jul. 16, 1991 ×
Republican People’s Party (CHP) Sep. 24, 1991 × ×
Nationalist Work Party (MÇP) Sep. 24, 1991 ×
Socialist Party Jul. 10, 1992 ×
People’s Labor Party (HEP) Jul. 14, 1993 × ×
Green Party Feb. 10, 1994 ×
Freedom and Democracy Party Nov. 23, 1993 ×
Socialist Turkey Party Nov. 30, 1993 ×
Democracy Party (DEP) Jun. 30, 1994 × ×
Democrat Partye Sep. 13, 1994 ×
Socialist Union Party Jul. 19, 1995 ×
Labor Party Feb. 14, 1997 ×
Revival Party Feb. 18, 1997 ×
Democratic Peace Movement May 22, 1997
Welfare Party (RP) Jan. 16, 1998 × ×
Democratic Mass Party Feb. 26, 1999 ×
Virtue Party (FP) Jun. 22, 2001 × ×
Total 31 22 6
Sources: Compiled by the author from Aliefendio%glu (1996, pp. 272–73, 288–89) for the 1962–95
period and from the Constitutional Court’s web site (http://www.anayasa.gov.tr) for the remaining
period.
a Acronyms are shown only for the parties referred to in the body text.
b Dates of disbandment for the 1961 constitutional period and dates of decision for the 1982 consti-
tutional period.
c × signifies a closure decision and a blank a rejection of the charges. The CHP was legalized after
the amendment on the law on political parties, enacted on June 19, 1992.
d The party, or individuals that later joined the party, gained parliamentary seats in the last election
before the party closure suit was filed.
e Formed in 1992 by those who tried to revive the DP that had been disbanded in 1960.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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the dissolution) and when the dissolution decision was submitted to the parliament (in
the case of the other parliamentarians of the party). After the filing of the dissolution
suit against the pro-Kurdish HEP on July 3, 1992, its parliamentarians joined the
newly established successor party, DEP. In the end, although the party was disbanded
and the four parliamentarians who became the reason for the dissolution lost their
seats in the parliament, the other parliamentarians of the party kept their seats due to
early exit (Ölmez 1995, pp. 255–56).
Articles 84 was amended in 1995 to limit the above-mentioned bans to the mem-
bers who became the reason for the disbandment. When the RP was disbanded in
1998,28 its parliamentarians were thus able to keep their seats as independents. Most
of them later joined the successor party, the FP. When the FP was disbanded in 2001,
a similar process was repeated. Almost all of its former parliamentarians first became
independents and soon joined either the AKP or the SP, its two successor parties.
Finally, more recent constitutional amendments for democratization in 1995 and
especially in 2001 made the disbanding of political parties more difficult. The amend-
ment, enacted on October 3, 2001, of Article 69 limited party disbandment to cases
where unconstitutional activities had been carried out intensively by party members
and were publicly acknowledged by the party leadership or parliamentary group, or
when those activities were carried out by the above party organizations out of convic-
tion. Previously, unconstitutional activities of any intensity by any member of the
party could be grounds for disbandment. The amendment of Article 69 also intro-
duced as an alternative to party closure the suspension of state subsidies, where
previously disbandment had been the only form of punishment. The 2001 amendment
of Article 149 increased the necessary votes for party closure by the constitutional
court from half to three-fifths of the judges.
7.5. Summary
This chapter began with the questions of: (1) why the relatively short period (1980–
83) of suspension of party politics in Turkey seriously damaged the embryonic link
between political parties and social cleavages and (2) why the recent party system in
Turkey became better able to represent Sunni religiosity and Kurdish ethnicity. Quali-
tative analysis was made into institutional changes as well as endogenous and exog-
enous factors that induced these changes. The answers to the questions are as follows.
First, the military government’s plan to make a radical break with the past and to
institute a stable two-party system not only failed but in the short run had a negative
effect on party-system institutionalization. The bans on the former politicians and
parties, though lifted early in 1987, were nevertheless sufficiently long to force
former politicians into retirement and to weaken the organizations of the disbanded
parties as well as to encourage factional splits within them. This long interruption
weakened the embryonic ties between societal groupings and political parties that had
begun to appear in the late 1970s.
Second, while both the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish parties consolidated their
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support in relative terms by the late 1990s, there are important differences between
them in the internal and external factors that facilitated the process. The pro-Islamic
party had to go through more severe electoral competition that the pro-Kurdish party,
which also benefited from external factors. The pro-Islamic party, which was formed
in 1970, was unable to quickly consolidate its support among devout Sunnis, who
tended to vote for the largest center-right party that seemed capable of forming a
government. Only after the pro-Islamic party became the first party in the parliament
in 1995 was it able to stabilize its relationship with devout Sunnis. The institutional
opening since 1961 played an important role in encouraging the creation of the pro-
Islamic party, but this did not help the party to meet a strong challenge from the
center-right parties later on.
For the pro-Kurdish party, both the Turkish public’s recognition of the Kurdish
issue and international attention to the Kurds prior to and during the Gulf Crisis/War
opened political opportunities for organizing a pro-Kurdish party in 1990. Since that
time, the party has continued to be supported by Kurdish voters, reemerging under a
new name each time it was disbanded by the state. In contrast to the pro-Islamic party,
it swiftly consolidated its relationship with its core supporters since no other party
could compete with it seriously for the same constituency. In sum, both internal and
external factors were favorable for the pro-Kurdish party compared to the pro-Islamic
party. This difference accounts for the pro-Islamic party’s longer struggle to forge a
party-cleavage nexus. Although the secularist and unitary-statist constitution led the
constitutional court to disband the pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish parties in the parlia-
ment, these parties overcame the challenges by forming successor parties of their
own.
Notes
1 The military had planned to institute a two-party system consisting of the center-right
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, MDP) and the center-left Populist
Party (Halkçı Parti, HP). Following the application by ANAP, founded by Turgut Özal, who
had worked for the World Bank in the 1970s and served during the 1980–82 period as vice
minister in the military government, the State Security Council allowed ANAP to take part
in the election since its members, consisting of businessmen and former bureaucrats, did
not have strong ties to previous political parties.
2 In the 1983 general election, ANAP won the largest share of votes, with 45.1%, trailed by
the HP (30.5%) and MDP (23.3%), which the military government explicitly supported.
3 According to Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 constitution, the ban on party leaders was to
be lifted in 1992.
4 All major political leaders including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan,
and Alparslan Türkes¸ legally became heads of successor parties.
5 While the ban on former political parties was lifted by Law 3821, approved on June 19,
1992, which abolished Law 2533, the practical significance was limited to allowing exist-
ing parties to use the names of parties disbanded by Law 2533. For more details, see note
27.
6 The principle of the unitary Turkish state rejects federalism and bans separatism.
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7 On political opportunities as a decisive factor for the emergence of social movements, see
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) and Tarrow (1998).
8 Özbudun (1993, pp. 20–21) cited the articles on political parties as the most important
measures under the 1961 constitution for creating a pluralist society.
9 For a list of political parties, see the following section of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly’s homepage: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/partiler/partiler.htm.
10 Ahmad (1977, p. 245) asserted that the pro-Islamic party represented the small bourgeoisie
such as small shopkeepers (esnafs) and artisans (sanaatkars) in Central Anatolia, who felt
increasingly neglected by the AP that represented the interests of large industrial capitalists.
11 The other splinter party from the AP was the Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti, DP),
which represented the declining large landowners (a%ga) who at the same time were from
the families of tribal leaders (as¸iret reisi) or religious leaders (s¸eyh). The party was formed
in reaction to the land reform and farm taxation proposed by Prime Minister Demirel of the
AP. See Ahmad (1977, p. 247).
12 Some of the people surrounding Kotku later became not only politicians but ministers
(Korkut Özal, Lütfü Do%gan, and Fehim Adak), a prime minister and president (Turgut
Özal), and other prime ministers (Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdo %gan) (Yavuz
2003, p. 141).
13 In particular, Alparslan Türkes¸, who took over the leadership of the CKMP, shifted its
ideology from secular nationalism to religious nationalism by the late 1960s, although
nationalism was its primary feature. The party’s name was changed to MHP in 1969. In the
1965 election, the party program and Türkes¸’s speeches defended secularism. As he later
developed an anti-communist campaign, however, Türkes¸ tried to supplement Turkish
nationalism with Muslim identity (Bora and Can 1991, p. 45).
14 See note 11.
15 Although MHP, which increased its vote percentage from 3.4 in 1973 to 6.4 in 1977, may
have attracted some of the former voters for the MSP, the MHP’s relationship with devout
Sunni voters in 1977 (r = 0.226, p = 0.066) was weaker than in 1973 (r = 0.299, p = 0.014)
and was weaker than the same relationship for the AP in 1977 (r = 0.364, p = 0.003).
16 Since the 1983 electoral law required political parties to gain 10 percent of the national vote
to gain seats in the parliament, the HEP joined the SHP, which was also seeking to buttress
its electoral chances in the southeastern region.
17 The PKK was established in 1978 with the aim of attaining Kurdish independence from
Turkey. In 1984, it began an armed insurgency in southeastern Turkey, targeting both the
military and civilians.
18 The author’s interview with Rus¸en Çakır, August 3, 2004, Istanbul.
19 Özal in effect achieved this change because despite his formal political independence,
which was constitutionally required, he had a great deal of influence over Prime Minister
Yıldırım Akbulut and thus the incumbent ANAP.
20 From 1995 to 2002, there were 14 Eastern Anatolian provinces and 9 Southeastern Anatolian
provinces in Turkey.
21 HADEP’s vote percentage in these provinces was 46.1 in Hakkari, 45.9 in Diyarbakır, 43.4
in Batman, 35.7 in Van, 33.7 in A %grı, 31.8 in Mus¸, 29.8 in I%gdır, 25.3 in Mardin, 24.1 in
S¸ırnak, 22.1 in Siirt, and 17.5 in Kars (Tuncer 1999, p. 317).
22 DEHAP’s vote percentage in these provinces was 56.1 in Diyarbakır, 47.1 in Batman, 45.9
in S¸ırnak, 45.1 in Hakkari, 40.9 in Van, 39.6 in Mardin, 38.1 in Mus¸, 35.1 in A %grı, 32.7 in
I %gdır, 32.6 in Tunceli, 32.2 in Siirt, 29.6 in Bitlis, and 19.6 in Kars (Tuncer, Kasapbas¸, and
Tuncer 2003, p. 461).
23 The English translation was found in the web site of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
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http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm (accessed July 20, 2006).
24 The citation is from the English translation found in the University of Wuerzburg's Interna-
tional Constitutional Law Version, http://www.jurisprudentia.de/jurisprudentia.html.
25 Özbudun (1993, p. 71) emphasized that not simply the judiciary but its highest organ made
the decision.
26 On a questionnaire survey of 85,000 respondents in 55 provinces in Turkey conducted by
Dokuz Eylül University, in response to the question of who could defend the principles of a
democratic and secular state and the rule of law, the most frequent answer (31.8 percent)
was “the constitutional court” (Hürriyet, February 15, 1997).
27 Article 96 of the law on political parties (Law 2820) was amended on June 19, 1992 by the
same law (Law 3821) that abolished the aforementioned Law 2533. Whereas the old article
prohibited parties from using the names, emblems, and symbols of disbanded parties, the
new article replaced “disbanded parties” with “parties disbanded by the constitutional
court,” thus exempting the parties that had been disbanded by the military government after
the 1980 military intervention.
28 The party lost time forming another party before the dissolution suit was filed.
